Question about race and admissions

Newjack88
Sun, 16 Mar 2008 11:52:28 +0000

If being “done here” means you have no further defenses to your claim that interests can indicate an applicant’s ethnicity, then by all means, feel free.

Nice. I honestly do not see the point of further debating that point. It has nothing to do with my argument for keeping race-based Affirmative Action.



In one of the dissents to Parents Involved, Justice Breyer criticized his colleagues in the majority for overruling Grutter, which dealt with universities and not high schools. Clearly, Justice Breyer disagreed with you that Parents Involved had no connection to universities. Furthermore, you still fail to understand that renaming is what doesn’t work. Renaming changes the external appearance but leaves the internal workings unmodified. That is why something that is patently un-Constitutional will always be patently un-Constitutional regardless of what it is called. That is what is applicable to future cases.

Actually, Grutter v. Bollinger had nothing to do with the case. Where did you read that it was overruled? Do you know what overruled means? If it had been overruled then Affirmative Action would not exist right now.

From http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/05-908.ZS.html:

Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306 , in which the Court held that, for strict scrutiny purposes, a government interest in student body diversity “in the context of higher education” is compelling. That interest was not focused on race alone but encompassed “all factors that may contribute to student body diversity,” id., at 337, including, e.g., having “overcome personal adversity and family hardship,” id., at 338. Quoting Justice Powell’s articulation of diversity in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 , the Grutter Court noted that “ ‘it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups,’ that can justify the use of race,” 539 U. S., at 324–325, but “ ‘a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element, ’ ” id., at 325. In the present cases, by contrast, race is not considered as part of a broader effort to achieve “exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints,” id., at 330; race, for some students, is determinative standing alone. The districts argue that other factors, such as student preferences, affect assignment decisions under their plans, but under each plan when race comes into play, it is decisive by itself. It is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a decision, as in Grutter; it is the factor. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244 . Even as to race, the plans here employ only a limited notion of diversity, viewing race exclusively in white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/“other” terms in Jefferson County. The Grutter Court expressly limited its holding—defining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context of higher education—but these limitations were largely disregarded by the lower courts in extending Grutter to the sort of classifications at issue here. Pp. 11–17.



I copied more than I actually had to in hopes that you would read it and realize how Affirmative Action actually works.