@HarvestMoon1: A diversion agreement is where charges are not prosecuted in exchange for (usually) some kind of probationary period. Classes like anger management/drug counseling are often also required. If the accused keeps clean for the probationary period, the charges are dismissed.
@“Cardinal Fang”: Courts generally agree that “Contacting,” as a verb, means in common usage physically touching or communicating." Cooper v. Cooper, 144 P.3d 451 (2006).
In a fairly similar case, People v. Welte, 920 N.Y.S.2d 627 (2011), the defendant was accused of, and did not contest that he, “obtained a list of the complainant’s friends from the complainant’s own Facebook account. He then contacted each one of these individuals, advising them that the complainant, Maureen L. Perry, was denying him access to his children. The supposition is that by doing so, the defendant was intentionally indirectly contacting the mother of his children, because she would hear of the allegations from her said friends and family.” That sounds to me the same theory by which some claim the accused contacted the accuser in the case we are discussing.
The court ultimately held that this did not qualify as “contact”:“the defendant’s action in contacting the complainants friends and family via her “Friends List” would not in the normal course of events violate any provision of law. In addition, the defendant was not directed to stay away from the friends and family of the complainant. Lastly, the accusatory instruments do not allege that the defendant was intentionally attempting to contact the complainant through her friends list, only that the defendant was not to contact her through a third person.” Those are essentially the same facts as we have in this case and therefore I think it likely the Kansas court would rule the same way. This may be why no further proceedings occurred in that court.
There are analogous cases supporting your position, see, e.g., Alford v. State, 965 N.E.2d 133, 135 (2012) (posting a negative review on a third party website constituted “contact”), though I frankly doubt the constitutionality of so broad a speech restriction. See State v. Ancira, 27 P.3d 1246 (2001) (the limitations in no contact orders must be strictly limited to that which is necessary for their function). Ultimately though, the closest case on point rejects this type of scenario as within the definition of “contact.”
It is also important that we disambiguate the court’s order from the university’s. The court is the one that would look to the definition of “contact.” The university must first determine that the regulated speech occurs within its jurisdiction (I do not think it did), then whether it could permissibly regulate it (I do not think it could, but this one could go either way), and then whether it was permissible to enforce the order in this case (whether as applied the speech restriction was overbroad, which I think it was, whether he met the definition of “contact” in the first place, which precedent suggests he did not, and whether the university followed its own rules in bringing the enforcement, which the Kansas court held it did not).