<p>Traitorous activity for the President of the United States would be an interesting legal precedence. However, incompetence and total mismanagement is not totally out of reason. Let’s look at the time line.</p>
<p>The first indication of a surge was 11/20/06 when Gen Pace is informed of such by the White House. There is no indication that Keane become involved until 12/11/06 when the American Enterprise Institute briefed the White House. Within a week, Rumsfeld is replaced. Immediately after that, Patraeus is announced as the replacement in Iraq for Casey. Also, Adm Fallon is announced as the replacement for Gen Abizzid. As you have pointed out, Casey, who was vocally opposed to the surge was promoted to Army Chief of Staff. One of Secretary Gate’s first moves is to not do the normal reappointment of General Pace as CJCS, but promotes Adm Mullen, the CNO, and also a vocal opponent of the surge, to replace him. Within a few months, the newly replaced military leadership, Mullen, Casey, and Fallon, all opposed to the surge, is in place. We don’t know Gates opinion from this article. Simultaneously, Keane, allowing himself to become a pawn of the Administration, commences to circumvent this new leadership by establishing a link directly between Iraq and the White House… </p>
<p>The new leadership was in place. If they were not capable of executing the plan, in place before they were appointed, they should nevert have been there. The surge orders had been executed. Patraeus saluted smartly and said “yes sir”. Things were moving as per the White House’s plan. Why was Keane necessary? The whole episode stinks. </p>
<p>In my day, when one received conflicting orders from someone not immediately superior in the chain of command, the first, and proper, thing to do was to notify that immediate superior. Keane allowed his ego to be fueled and, probably unnecessarily, circumvented the system. He was way out of line and has done serious unnecessary damage to both our military leadership and the civilian/military interface thereof.</p>
<p>Also, in my day, part of an officer’s responsibility was, when they disagreed with their superior, to go behind closed doors and let the fur fly. Upon departing the office, he was to state, “I believe” followed by whatever the point of contention was. Not the captain’s belief, nor the Admirals, but “I”. Anyone unable to do this did not belong in that chain of command. In this situation, it did not happen. And Woodward has not fully explained why.</p>
<p>I guess Army leadership is somehow different? It would take some strange ideas to make the following comment:</p>
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