<p>On March 7, 2003 the Director General of the IAEA reported to the United Nations Security Council that the documents that had been given to him were not authentic. His deputy, Jacques Baute, was even more direct, pointing out that the forgeries were so obvious that a quick Google search would have exposed their flaws. A State Department spokesman was quoted the next day as saying about the forgeries We fell for it. From that time on the details surrounding the documents became public knowledge and were widely reported. I was not the source of information regarding the forensic analysis of the documents in question; the IAEA was. </p>
<p>The first time I spoke publicly about the Niger issue was in response to the State Department’s disclaimer. On CNN a few days later, in response to a question, I replied that I believed the US government knew more about the issue than the State Department spokesman had let on and that he had misspoken. I did not speak of my trip.</p>
<p>My first public statement was in my article of July 6 published in the New York Times, written only after it became apparent that the administration was not going to deal with the Niger question unless it was forced to. I wrote the article because I believed then, and I believe now, that it was important to correct the record on the statement in the President’s State of the Union address which lent credence to the charge that Iraq was actively reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. I believed that the record should reflect the facts as the US government had known them for over a year. The contents of my article do not appear in the body of the report and is not quoted in the additional comments. In that article, I state clearly that As for the actual memorandum, I never saw it. But news accounts have pointed out that the documents had glaring errors - they were signed, for example, by officials who were no longer in government - and were probably forged. (And then there’s the fact that Niger formally denied the charges.)</p>
<p>The first time I actually saw what were represented as the documents was when Andrea Mitchell, the NBC correspondent handed them to me in an interview on July 21. I was not wearing my glasses and could not read them. I have to this day not read them. I would have absolutely no reason to claim to have done so. My mission was to look into whether such a transaction took place or could take place. It had not and could not. By definition that makes the documents bogus. </p>
<p>The text of the additional comments also asserts that during Mr. Wilson’s media blitz, he appeared on more than thirty television shows including entertainment venues. Time and again, Joe Wilson told anyone who would listen that the President had lied to the American people, that the Vice President had lied, and that he had debunked the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. </p>
<p>My article in the New York Times makes clear that I attributed to myself a small role in the effort to verify information about Africa’s suspected link to Iraq’s nonconventional weapons programs. After it became public that there were then Ambassador to Niger, Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick’s report and the report from a four star Marine Corps General, Carleton Fulford in the files of the U. S. government, I went to great lengths to point out that mine was but one of three reports on the subject. I never claimed to have debunked the allegation that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. I claimed only that the transaction described in the documents that turned out to be forgeries could not have and did not occur. I did not speak out on the subject until several months after it became evident that what underpinned the assertion in the State of the Union address were those documents, reports of which had sparked Vice President Cheney’s original question that led to my trip. The White House must have agreed. The day after my article appeared in the Times a spokesman for the President told the Washington Post that the sixteen words did not rise to the level of inclusion in the State of the Union.</p>
<p>I have been very careful to say that while I believe that the use of the sixteen words in the State of the Union address was a deliberate attempt to deceive the Congress of the United States, I do not know what role the President may have had other than he has accepted responsibility for the words he spoke. I have also said on many occasions that I believe the President has proven to be far more protective of his senior staff than they have been to him. </p>
<p>The additional comments also assert: The Committee found that, for most analysts the former ambassador’s report lent more credibility, not less, to the reported Niger-Iraq uranium deal. In fact, the body of the Senate report suggests the exact opposite:</p>
<p>o In August, 2002, a CIA NESA report on Iraq’s weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities did not include the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium information. (pg. 48)</p>
<p>o In September, 2002, during coordination of a speech with an NSC staff member, the CIA analyst suggested the reference to Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from Africa be removed. The CIA analyst said the NSC staff member said that would leave the British flapping in the wind. (pg. 50)</p>
<p>o The uranium text was included in the body of the NIE but not in the key judgments. When someone suggested that the uranium information be included as another sign of reconstitution, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst spoke up and said the he did not agree with the uranium reporting and that INR would be including text indicating their disagreement in their footnote on nuclear reconstitution. The NIO said he did not recall anyone really supporting including the uranium issue as part of the judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, so he suggested that the uranium information did not need to be part of the key judgments. He told Committee staff he suggested that We’ll leave it in the paper for completeness. Nobody can say we didn’t connect the dots. But we don’t have to put that dot in the key judgments. (pg. 53)</p>
<p>o On October 2, 2002, the Deputy DCI testified before the SSCI. Senator Jon Kyl asked the Deputy DCI whether he had read the British White Paper and whether he disagreed with anything in the report. The Deputy DCI testified that the one thing where I think they stretched a little bit beyond where we would stretch is on the points about where Iraq seeking uranium from various African locations. (pg.54)</p>
<p>o On October 4, 2002 the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs testified that there is some information on attempts
.there’s a question about those attempts because of the control of the material in those countries
For us it’s more the concern that they (Iraq) uranium in country now. (pg. 54)</p>