<p>^HAHAHAHAHAHAHA the funny thing is that it’s right</p>
<p>In that scenario, pirates 4 and 5 get nothing, no matter what happens, so, there’s no logical reason for them to vote for your plan as opposed to not. They could just as easily say **** you and let you die. It’s all the same to them.</p>
<p>I think we’ve established that it is always in pirates 2 and 3’s best interest to vote against you, which means that you have to make 4 and 5 vote for you. In the same way, pirate 2 also needs their votes.</p>
<p>What this means, is that Pirate 2 will offer them 1 gold each to vote for him, and since they won’t be getting anything from Pirate 3, they will take it.</p>
<p>Then, to ensure their voting for you, you have to offer them more than the 1 gold that they’ll be getting from pirate 2.</p>
<p>I think the solution is: 96-0-0-2-2.</p>
<p>^But if we add the condition that they’ll take the highest they can get and prefer not to die, then 100-0-0-0-0 is reasonable.</p>
<p>I submit to you, an answer: [5</a> Pirates - Solution](<a href=“5 Pirates Puzzle - Solution”>5 Pirates Puzzle - Solution)</p>
<p>But 4 and 5 aren’t ever going to die, because they will always concede first. We’re working under the assumption that they don’t care whether you die or not. Therefore, they’ll vote for whoever will give them the most gold. Pirate 2 will give them each 1 gold, so if you offer them nothing, they won’t vote for you.</p>
<p>That solution you linked to seems suspect. The question says that you need 50% or more to pass, while the solution seems to be operating under the assumption, like us, that you need more than 50%.</p>
<p>Regardless, I’m changing my answer to 97-0-1-0-2 (or 97-0-1-2-0). Here’s why:</p>
<p>If Pirate 1’s plan is rejected, and he dies, then Pirate 2 will offer 1 gold each to pirates 4 and 5, more than they would get under Pirate 3, thus securing their votes. This means that Pirate 3 is guaranteed to be getting nothing under Pirate 2.</p>
<p>This means that you can secure the vote of Pirate 3 by offering him one gold.</p>
<p>Now, you still need one more vote. Pirate 2 will never vote for you, because he stands to gain 98 gold if you die. That means you need the vote of either Pirate 4 or Pirate 5, both of whom will be getting a single gold under Pirate 2. So, in order to get either of their votes, you have to offer 2 gold, more than they will be receiving under Pirate 2.</p>
<p>So, there it is: 97-0-1-0-2 or 97-0-1-2-0. Whichever floats your boat.</p>
<p>mathsciencedude totally killed the point of this thread 
Which was to give all us math wiz CCers a fun debate. 97-0-1-0-2 is correct. The website’s explanation is very thorough.</p>
<p>I did this problem a few weeks ago with my roommates (5 of them). Basically, if pirate 1’s plan is rejected then pirate 2 proposes 98-0-1-1 (contrary to what the website says), because if pirate 2 is rejected, then pirate 3 proposes 100-0-0. Pirate 4 cannot say no because he has a 50% of death (pirate 5 being evil or not evil) and wouldn’t get any gold either way. He picks pirate 3’s plan because he wants the MOST benefit, and guaranteeing his own survival is probably the best.</p>
<p>Going back, we know that pirate 5 would get 1 gold from pirate 2’s plan. Therefore, if pirate 1 were to propose 98-0-1-0-1, then pirate 5 has a 50% chance of rejecting my plan. Pirate 3 knows that if pirate 2 were to propose a plan, he wouldn’t get any gold. Therefore, pirate 1’s optimal plan is 97-0-1-0-2. Kudos to all who got the correct answer.</p>
<p>You guys can continue to debate other answers. I hope this problem was fun and kept your minds busy for at least 5 minutes each day!</p>
<p>Sorry, 
.</p>
<p>Anyone interested in extending this to a general solution for n pirates?</p>
<p>Ok, I’ve got it. For n=50 pirates the correct solution is:</p>
<p>72, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 2, 2</p>
<p>Assuming I didn’t make any mistakes typing that.</p>
<p>Also, at 196 it takes all your gold just to stay alive. if there’s more than 197 pirates you’re finished.</p>
<p>I miscounted. It’s actually this:</p>
<p>72, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 2</p>
<p>No gold at 198, dead at 200+</p>
<p>Just pay every other pirate 1 coin, except the last 3 who must be paid specially.</p>