Five to be fired for Minot nuclear mistake

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<p>I cannot imagine long term concurrent storage. It is a waste of space but more importantly a waste of procedures. Why impose the very stringent accountability of nukes with non-nukes which would be necessary if they were stored together? It would undoubtedly lead to compromise. </p>

<p>I have read recently in relation to this incident conflicting statements that both the AF did and did not store nukes and conventionals together. Maybe in ready storage areas but I highly doubt elsewhere. If they did store them concurrently, the continuing career of the person who made that decision should, in my opinion, be questioned.<br>

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<p>Surely you cannot be serious. This is probably the most serious breach of nuclear security in the history of the military. Accountability of nuclear weapons must be flawless. Anything less results in lost, or even more critical, stolen weapons. All it would require would be a warhead in a location that only a single unscrupulous airman with financial problems knew about. The rest could literally be history. </p>

<p>Senior to the highest ranking person who knew what was going on, is the person responsible for his training and knowledge and execution of proper procedures. That person is perhaps more accountable than the lazy individual who skipped a step. And even the next level above this, not recognizing that proper procedures were not being implemented. It is called accountability. The Chairman of the JCS will definitely recognize the need for it. Heads should roll. </p>

<p>My question is did the ensuing inventory turn up any more missing or misplaced warheads? Was this a lone incident?</p>