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<p>Uh, no, it is your analogy that makes no sense.</p>
<p>The major difference is that lawyers, unlike firemen, actually create their own demand. That is because there is no set demand for legal services, rather, that demand is determined by the lawyers themselves. The number of fires that happen is purely exogenous, but not the number of potential legal services, for the more lawyers you have, the more reasons that will be found for one party to sue another, which then spurs the demand for even more lawyers to defend against those lawsuits, etc. </p>
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<p>No, you don’t understand my argument. To use econspeak, what happens is that each lawyer creates an externality of positive demand for more lawyers. But that externality cannot be captured by that individual lawyer, or even by one firm. Instead, that externality accrues to the legal profession as a whole. But that means that each individual law firm has an incentive to ‘underinvest’ because that law firm disregards the positive externality it provides to the market.</p>
<p>This is a classic case of network effects and individual underinvestment. For example, the more telephones there are in the world, the more valuable each telephone becomes, because more phones in the world means more people that you can communicate with. {It’s also clearly useless for there to be only 1 phone in the world, because you wouldn’t be able to talk to anybody). But each individual phone customer doesn’t really care about the beneficial externality he provides to the others. If he buys a phone, he boosts the value of every other phone in the world, but he doesn’t care. If he disconnects his phone, he decreases the value of every other phone in the world, but he doesn’t care. He only cares about his own value. {This has been the argument used for government to step in and actively subsidize phone network buildouts because individual customers do not have sufficient incentives to purchase a socially optimal number of phones.} </p>
<p>Hence, no individual law firm can simply create demand out of the ether. All law firms together can generate demand for each other, but obviously they won’t coordinate with each other. Hence, it is entirely rational for individual law firms to reduce staff even if that reduces the externality, because by definition, each individual actor doesn’t factor in the externality. </p>
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<p>Oh, I don’t know, contingency fees perhaps?. If your lawyer doesn’t win, then you don’t have to pay him. The customer has nothing to lose; he either wins a lawsuit and gets a payout, or he loses and pays nothing. </p>
<p>Like I said, the more lawyers there are, the more of them who will be finding reasons for lawsuits, paid by contingency, which then spurs defendants to hire more lawyers to defend themselves against these lawsuits, which then spurs the litigants to hire even larger legal staffs to increase the odds of winning these lawsuits, etc. etc. </p>
<p>That speaks to the other strong network effect of the legal profession, which is its arms race characteristic. There is literally no limit to the number of lawyers you can put on a case, as long as you have the money (or the contingent potential for money). The more lawyers you have on your side, the more lawyers the other side will want to have, which then increases your demand for still more lawyers, etc.</p>