<p>In terms of dealing with facts contrary to beliefs, lets look at FF’s claims and the written documentation:</p>
<p>What FF said:<br>
- Joe Wilson was peddling his story that he was a) sent by Cheney.</p>
<p>What Wilson actually said (in Times piece which started the fuss):
“In February 2002, I was informed by officials at the Central Intelligence Agency that Vice President Dick Cheney’s office had questions about a particular intelligence report. While I never saw the report, I was told that it referred to a memorandum of agreement that documented the sale of uranium yellowcake - a form of lightly processed ore - by Niger to Iraq in the late 1990’s. The agency officials asked if I would travel to Niger to check out the story so they could provide a response to the vice president’s office.”</p>
<p>The Senate report:
Officials from the CIA’s DO CounterproliferationDivision (CPD) told Committee staff that in response to questions from the Vice President’s Office and the Departments of State and Defense on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal, CPD officials discussed ways to obtain additional information… CPD decided to contact a former ambassador to Gabon who had a posting early in his career in Niger.</p>
<p>Bottom line: Wilson didn’t claim what FF says he said. What Wilson actually said was entirely accurate.</p>
<p>FF: Cheney did not know about Wilson per se </p>
<p>Senate Report: In early March 2002, the Vice President asked his morning briefer for an update on the Niger uranium issue. In response, on March 5,2002, WINPAC analysts sent an analytic update to the briefer which noted that the government of Niger said it was making all efforts to ensure that its uranium would be used for only peaceful purposes. … The update also noted that the CIA would be debriefing a source who may have information related to the alleged sale on March 5. … Later that day, two CIA DO officers debriefed the former ambassador who had returned from Niger the previous day.</p>
<p>Bottom line: Cheney may not have known about Wilson by name, but he was advised that Wilson was about to be debriefed about his trip on March 5, 2002, as in fact occurred.</p>
<p>FF: Wilson “denied that his wife had anything to do with his appointment”, /// indeed he was nominated by his wife </p>
<p>The exact nature of the communications with Wilson’s wife within the CIA are unclear. She was definitely consulted about her husband’s qualifications and availability. You use the terms “nominated” which exceeds anything in the Senate Report. There are no contemporaneous writings that have been disclosed; what is known is that Wilson’s wife did not have the authority to “send” him on her own authority; that decision was made at a level at the CIA above her. Cheney’s characterization of Wilson’s fact-finding trip - the second Wilson was sent on to Africa - as a “junket” was just, well - Cheney being Cheney.</p>
<p>FF: b) that his report refuted all notions of the uranium from Niger issue // his report was so unremarkeable that it was never conveyed to Cheney. </p>
<p>Wilson: “Before I left Niger, I briefed the ambassador on my findings, which were consistent with her own. I also shared my conclusions with members of her staff. In early March, I arrived in Washington and promptly provided a detailed briefing to the C.I.A. I later shared my conclusions with the State Department African Affairs Bureau. There was nothing secret or earth-shattering in my report, just as there was nothing secret about my trip.”</p>
<p>Senate Report: He told Committee staff that he had told both U.S.officials he thought there
was “nothing to the story.” Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick told Committee staff she recalled the former ambassador saying “he had reached the same conclusions that the embassy had reached, that it was highly unlikely that anything was going on.”</p>
<p>FF:Cheney/Bush ignored his report and continued to peddle the Niger issue. </p>
<p>Wilson: “Those are the facts surrounding my efforts. The vice president’s office asked a serious question. I was asked to help formulate the answer. I did so, and I have every confidence that the answer I provided was circulated to the appropriate officials within our government… The question now is how that answer was or was not used by our political leadership. If my information was deemed inaccurate, I understand (though I would be very interested to know why). If, however, the information was ignored because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses.”</p>
<p>Senate Report: The intelligence report based on the former ambassador’s trip was disseminated on March 8,2002. … DO officials also said they alerted WINPAC analysts when the report was being disseminated because they knew the high priority of the issue. The report was widely distributed in routine channels…
…CIA’s briefer did not brief the Vice President on the report, despite the Vice President’s previous questions about the issue.</p>
<p>FF: He also reported that the documents were forgeries///he lied about uncovering the forgeries</p>
<p>Wilson’s piece in the Times: “As for the actual memorandum, I never saw it. But news accounts have pointed out that the documents had glaring errors they were signed, for example, by officials who were no longer in government and were probably forged.”</p>
<p>—Fun as this is, I’m off for a while and won’t be able to play for a week or so. See you all when I get back.</p>