<p>If we are going to attempt to dissect this “Soft Power” strategy relative to it’s application and divergence to what we may feel are inconsistencies in the changes underway at the Academy you have to make some assumptions about the reasons underlying the changes. How much of the changes are truly being driven around the “Nation at war philosophy” vs. a response/back lash to the actions of a few and bad press the Academy has received during the past few years. It’s possible as events unfold and the changes evolve we will conclude there is not much inconsistency in the policy relative to what is being taught and the kind of education they graduate with. I think this Nation at War approach is more about their interest in making members of the Brigade understand the potential sacrifices that lay ahead. Some of it may also be useful as a cover, rather than come out and say we’re doing this because of what has happened over the past few years etc. you say instead we’re going to make changes based on our status as a nation at war. </p>
<p>One thing I’d like to throw out for discussion about the this Soft Power approach, while I certainly feel it is an appropriate change in our policy and will hopefully help improve our security and relations with nations around the world; I can’t help thinking that it also has the potential to dramatically increase the number of causalities we will see in the near term. When you send men and women into the field, off ships and out of more secure environments, you have the opportunity to make contact with both good and bad guys. The folks we are fighting don’t look at the potential for collateral damage as a bad thing….it’s their goal. </p>
<p>Along these lines I was reading about the riverine patrol boats and the associated missions of maritime security and thinking, man these guys are exposed, small boat, no place to go, close to shore; it won’t take much. The more time we spend close to people we are trying to win over, the higher the price is going to be.</p>