<p>First, apologies to the OP for the thread hijack. This will be my last post on this subject.</p>
<p>Fundingfather, I did pull up all five volumes of the IPP. I read the abstract before I posted the first time. But thank you for asking.</p>
<p>From the Executive Summary, page 15, volume 1:</p>
<p>"The Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) review of captured Iraqi documents uncovered strong evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism. Despite their incompatible long-term goals, many terrorist movements and Saddam found a common enemy in the United States. At times these organizations worked together, trading access for capability. In the period after the 1991 Gulf War, the regime of Saddam Hussein supported a complex and increasingly disparate mix of pan-Arab revolutionary causes and emerging pan-Islamic radical movements. The relationship between Iraq and forces of pan-Arab socialism was well known and was in fact one of the defining qualities of the Ba’ath movement.</p>
<p>“But the relationships between Iraq and the groups advocating radical pan-Islamic doctrines are much more complex. This study found no ‘smoking gun’ (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam’s Iraq and al Qaeda. Saddam’s interest in, and support for, non-state actors was spread across a variety
of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. Some in the regime recognized the potential high internal and external costs of maintaining relationships with radical Islamic groups, yet they concluded that in some cases, the benefits of association outweighed the risks. A review of available Iraqi documents indicated the following:
The Iraqi regime was involved in regional and international terrorist operations prior to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. The predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq.
On occasion, the Iraqi intelligence servIces directly targeted the regime’s
perceived enemies, including non-Iraqis. Non-Iraqi casualties often resulted from Iraqi sponsorship of non-governmental terrorist groups.
Saddam’s regime often cooperated directly, albeit cautiously, with terrorist
groups when they believed such groups could help advance Iraq’s long-term goals. The regime carefully recorded its connections to Palestinian terror organizations in numerous government memos.”</p>
<p>The abstract can be found on page 93, volume 1.</p>
<p>Volumes two through five contain a list with descriptions of the documents found, translated, and included. (As of 2006, only 15% of the documents had been translated.) For example, document 7, volume 2, page 520:
“This 52 page file contains memos and correspondence, dated 1999-2002, within the Iraqi Intelligence Service (115), about preparing and executing a mission related to blowing up a Turkish School in Northern Iraq, team of experts specialized in explosives to produce and test explosives for Fedayeen Saddam, disassembling a booby-trapped vehicle in Maysan Governorate.” Just as referenced in the McClatchy article.</p>
<p>From document 1, volume 2, page 4: “This 71 pages file contains reports within the Iraqi Intelligence Service (115), dated between 3 June 1992 and 10 May 1994, regarding an investigation made about the failures and premature exploded bombs, and other explosives. These bombs were intended and planed to destroy targets, including the residence of the US Ambassador in Jakarta, the Office of the American Airlines and Japanese Embassy in the Philippines, targets and installations in Iran ·and other undisclosed locations elsewhere.”</p>
<p>I found the link to the McClatchy article by clicking on the link at the bottom of the page you cited on the FAS website.<br>
“The study was first reported prior to release by Warren P. Strobel of McClatchy Newspapers.”
[DoD</a> Report on Captured Iraqi Documents Secrecy News](<a href=“http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/03/dod_report_on_captured_iraqi_d.html]DoD”>http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/03/dod_report_on_captured_iraqi_d.html)</p>
<p>(For the record, I don’t have a problem with McClatchy as a source.) </p>
<p>I repeat:</p>
<p>Saddam Hussein’s links to regional and global terrorism were never in dispute.</p>
<p>Speculation that Saddam Hussein might have decided at some point to link up directly with the terrorist al Qaida network against the United States doesn’t negate the fact that he didn’t. </p>
<p>If you can cite evidence from any of the IPP volumes supporting such a direct connection, I would be happy to read it. If you can provide cites in the documents for the “de facto” links between Saddams security organizations and Osama bin Ladens terrorist network to the outside groups they had in common (as I am certainly no expert), I would appreciate it. Thanks.</p>