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<p>Asserting that there is implicit acknowledgment of a right to life says nothing about the justification. Justifications are of secondary concern; a religious person might uphold such an ideal because it violates his doctrinal beliefs, and a pragmatist might uphold the same ideal because it fails the test of utility. Regardless, we end up at the same place: agreement regarding the belief that meaningless murder is wrong. To say that people do not believe in a “right to life” but believe that “meaningless murder” is wrong (for whatever reason) amounts to nothing but semantics.</p>
<p>So, regarding semantics, taking your words, “because people believe meaningless murder is wrong,” I will not attempt infer any sort of justification behind such belief, but will instead simply acknowledge that people agree to its necessity. In doing so, we’ve established a fundamental moral premise in our social contract. We can call it the right to not be murdered meaninglessly, but, for the sake of simplicity, we’ll call it “right to life.” </p>
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<p>As I’ve already stated, the viewpoint from which I’m arguing does not represent my personal views at all. I’ve already acknowledged the ultimately arbitrary nature of morality, and, as such, I’m arguing within a social contract framework. No, not everyone has to argue from such framework, but, without it, we’re left with nothing but relativism. So, unless we wish to devolve into fundamental, perennial disagreement, we must establish a framework within which we CAN debate. For the sake of practicality, I’ve chosen the contractarian premise, but you can’t seem to wrap your head around exactly what said premise entails.</p>
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<p>Are we referring to the same idea of euthanasia? The euthanasia I have in mind only questions right to life for a specific subset of a population (those with terminal illnesses, those who will be born with inhumane diseases, etc.). It does NOT question whether an “typical” human being, presumably one such as yourself, has the right to live. It’s an attempt to define what constitutes “humane” and whether “inhumane” circumstances warrant a breach on the ideal of right to life. </p>
<p>If we were to argue that there ISN’T an implicit (or explicit) right to life, then 1) euthanasia wouldn’t receive the controversy it does and 2) we wouldn’t attempt to restrict it to those with terminal illnesses and whatnot.</p>
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<p>Nor do you speak for everyone who supports (or opposes) euthanasia/eugenics, so the very same statement applies to you. I’m simply stating what I’ve gathered to be the standard euthanasia proponent’s argument and justification. Of course, opinions vary and a proponent could very well support euthanasia simply because he dislikes the sight of sick people or the clogging of hospitals. Fringe elements are everywhere. However, this is simply what I perceive to be the “mainstream” justification, that it is an attempt to lessen the pain on the suffering.</p>
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<p>Or perhaps you’re the one who simply doesn’t understand. I didn’t establish the social contract this particular way. If we were to poll everyone in our society and ask whether meaningless murder or political discrimination is wrong, an overwhelming majority of society would argue that they are. That’s how the ideals of our social contract are formed – not because I personally believe there is a right to life or protection from discrimination.</p>
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<p>While legal codes do not perfectly mirror nor define our social contract, the ideals to which our society agrees are largely represented in our statutes. Of course, the contract itself is intangible and ultimately exists in the opinions of our societal constituents, but a legal document is an attempt to codify our constituents’ beliefs. As such, referring to (largely) accepted documents such as the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution is the best way to gauge which ideals our social contract contains.</p>
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<p>Maybe you missed my point entirely. That’s exactly what I said. If we were to pointlessly debate the semantics of the word “murder,” we’re essentially debating where murder stops and where murder starts. If I believed animals were people, then the definition of murder and the consequences it entails also apply to animals. If you believed animals were NOT people, the the definition of murder would stop at the Homo sapien boundary and not extend to cows or pigs. </p>
<p>But what have we done in our debate over just what constitutes murder and what doesn’t? We’ve implicitly acknowledged that (meaningless) murder is wrong.</p>
<p>This is the point I’m trying to make with same-sex unions and discrimination. As you’ve stated, opponents may not view bans on same-sex unions as an issue of discrimination at all (an absurd stance, might I add). Proponents (like myself) argue that such bans DO amount to discrimination. But in our argument, we’ve implicitly acknowledged that the vague ideal of anti-discrimination is valid.</p>
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<p>Any stance would appear absurd if you substitute a word whose definition isn’t even remotely related to the stance. If I argued that both horses and cows have a right to eat grass, and that grass-eating constituted a fundamental right to them, the opposition might argue that the fundamental right of grass-eating only applies to horses, not cows.</p>
<p>You could just as well substitute the word “genocide” in for “grass-eating” in this argument, and of course it would appear nonsensical.</p>
<p>It’d read: both horses and cows have a right to genocide, and genocide constitutes a fundamental right to them. The opposition argues that the fundamental right of genocides only applies to horses, not cows.</p>
<p>Such a statement appears absurd because the definition of “genocide” isn’t remotely related to dietary measures of cows and horses. However, the definition of “grass-eating” IS. </p>
<p>Your stance amounts to arguing that “grass-eating” is just as unrelated as “genocide” when discussing the diets of cows. </p>
<p>If we were to define discrimination as differential treatment based on arbitrary standard(s) and genocide as the massacre of a subset of a population, then the definition of discrimination is MUCH more applicable to bans on same-sex unions than the definition of genocide. Opponents might attempt to qualify discrimination or argue that protections against political discrimination should not apply to homosexual couples, but 1) the applicability of discrimination is much stronger and 2) the argument still implicitly acknowledges that the vague of ideal of anti-discrimination is valid.</p>
<p>In fact, to deny that bans on same-sex unions does NOT amount to discrimination is absurd, based on the definition of “discrimination.” However, one might qualify that some types of discrimination are valid and that, specifically, POLITICAL discrimination against this subset is valid. However, there can be no denying that there IS discrimination. </p>
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<p>To deny that bans on same-sex unions does NOT amount to discrimination is absurd (see explanation above). It’s about how far protections against discrimination should extend.</p>
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<p>Of course simply being a part of society does not preclude an individual from disagreeing with certain ideals. However, should an individual find such ideals completely irreconcilable, said individual would have no choice but to leave society.
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<p>See above section regarding legal codes. Our laws operate within the framework of the social contract. Society must decide whether it agrees with the validity of certain laws via voting, litigation, protests, etc. If it does, then the ideals of our laws become part of our social contract. For example, 1776 American society accepted the ideals (right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness) contained in the Declaration of Independence, and such ideals have since been incorporated into the social contract. This is easily evidenced by the constant reference to their existence when discussing controversial issues such as desegregation and euthanasia.</p>
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<p>Determining with a specific issue bears any relevance to an ideal is also part of the debate. If we establish that the issue IS related to the ideal, then we evaluate the issue on consistency with said ideal.</p>
<p>For this specific case, it’s absurd to argue that discrimination does NOT apply to same-sex union. However, we could still evaluate the consistency of our bans on same-sex union within the framework of our ideal of anti-discrimination by arguing that some types of discrimination ARE valid (an argument which I refute).</p>