Presidential Race

Parent Cafe
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<p>ID, thanks for the link to the Burns interview. It was very interesting and refreshing to hear first-hand information about the situation. What I came away from it is:</p>

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<li><p>that indeed the surge may be our only hope to stabilize the situation</p></li>
<li><p>that the odds are not great of the surge working</p></li>
<li><p>that American commanders on the ground also agree that the surge is required for there to be any hope.</p></li>
<li><p>that American casualties could go up</p></li>
<li><p>That the effect of the US withdrawing from the area would be catastrophic not only in terms of an incredible increase in bloodshed but also in terms of our long-term relationship with any of the moderate nations in the area. Failure could result in a long term negative transformation of the region.</p></li>
<li><p>That now is not the time to attempt to negotiate with Iran but there may be a possibility for this if the surge is effective.</p></li>
<li><p>That indeed Iran is behind much of the violence and that the “hostages” were not diplomats. </p></li>
<li><p>That al Qaeda is inextricably linked with the Sunni insurgency - in other words the battle is not just between two religious groups with al Qaeda playing a small third-party role. This IS the principle battle with al Qaeda.</p></li>
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<p>What I don’t understand after hearing this very compelling interview is, if you believe what Burns is saying, how can you be against the surge and for pulling our troops out? Yes, the odds may be long, but they certainly beat what he claims is the inevitable horrible result for both the US and the region if we pull out.</p>

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<p>BedHead:</p>

<p>Brookings Institute published their 140 page report Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War today. It’s available here:</p>

<p><a href=“http://www.brook.edu/fp/saban/analysis/jan2007iraq_civilwar.htm[/url]”>http://www.brook.edu/fp/saban/analysis/jan2007iraq_civilwar.htm&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

<p>Fascinating reading, I’m sure. I just started reading it. Probably more useful than debating “the surge”.</p>

<p>Also, on the topic of Al Queda and the instigation of Shia/Sunni warfare, here’s a quote from a recent Brookings paper on the state of Al Queda today:</p>

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<p>The full report is here:</p>

<p><a href=“http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/riedel/20070118.htm[/url]”>http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/riedel/20070118.htm&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

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<p>To me, being “for” or “against” the surge is irrelevant. The surge is going to happen for 90 to 180 days, no matter what anyone thinks. It’s a fait accompli. The President has made it very clear that he will ignore any other advice, just as he ignored the advice of the Baker-Hamilton commission.</p>

<p>As for a dialog with the Iranians. If you believe Burns’ contention that all Middle Eastern negotiations derive from perception of power, then you have to conclude what Mini and I have both been saying: that the United States missed a golden opportunity to open channels of discussion with Iran at the time leading up to and shortly after the Iraq invasion. The Iranian perception of US power was at its peak during the march to Baghdad. Iran was genuinely concerned about American power as evidenced by their very restrained behavior during that period. </p>

<p>It would have been the perfect time to make some quiet assurances of a US interest in exploring a relationship with Iran. I believe that Bush’s belligerence was a major foreign relations blunder that set the stage for somewhat moderate political forces in Iran to be replaced by the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005.</p>

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<p>Because of the real possibility that adding more troops to the situation–without providing enough troops to accomplish anything material–is going to make the situation worse rather than better. The Iraq Prime Minister himself holds this opinion, and it’s rumored that the NIE report says the same thing. </p>

<p>As one commentator I read recently pointed out, this isn’t an apt analogy to throwing a Hail Mary. In a football game where you need a Hail Mary, it’s worth trying even if statistically unlikely to succeed, because if it fails, you’re no worse off than before. </p>

<p>But a failed surge is likely to leave us (and Iraq) in a worse position than before. Given that it’s statistically likely to fail, we’re taking a large risk for a slim possibility of reward. And doing it on borrowed money, to boot.</p>

<p>ETA: Give me the # of troops that General Petraus says is needed to make the clear, seize, hold strategy work, and I’ll support that. But I don’t support a symbolic escalation that’s most likely only going to worsen the world situation.</p>

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<p>Fundingfather: I was against the surge, but recognizing it as a done deal, hope to god it works. Burns was very cautious in his statements; reflecting I guess an attempt to try to maintain at least a facade of journalistic objectivity. So he was hesitant to be too for or against anything, I noticed. But I agree with your summary. The question is how much hope to place in the surge, and I think it’s clear he thinks not much, but is open-minded.</p>

<p>My point is: if the surge doesn’t work within the 3 months timeframe he suggested – or I said earlier by July, won’t it then be time to cut the losses and pull out. Would you agree with a deadline?</p>

<p>My fear is some are using the surge as a veil for dragging things out indefinitely. And, again, I think Bush’s goal is for this thing not to end at a time he can be blamed full-stop.</p>

<p>Oh, and with respect to the inevitable, delaying it doesn’t make it less inevitable. If the surge doesn’t work, we’ll never through any realistically achievable means put Iraq in a situation where it won’t be on the verge of unrestrained civil war when we leave. So why should we ask our soldiers to die, and our citizens to pay, for nothing.</p>

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<p>The timeframe for a true “clear, hold, and build” strategy in Bahgdad would require the presence of the US forces for years. </p>

<p>IMO, the real purpose of the “surge” is to create the perception of progress (real or imagined) sufficient to quell US political pressure to begin a pullout of US forces. This perception could be created by a lull in violence, signs of intelligent life in the Iraqi “government”, etc.</p>

<p>BTW, I’ve made it through the executive summary of the new Brookings paper on containment of an Iraqi civil war. It is already clear what the US military pull out must look like – redeployment out of Iraqi population centers to the border regions where large refugee camps will be set up by the United States as buffers to prevent millions of refugees from destabilizing neighboring countries and stemming the flow of resources from neighboring countries into the civil war.</p>

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<p>Conyat: I think by and large I agree with everything you’ve said. However, I don’t agree that the surge necessarily puts us in a worse place, particularly when you factor in that the surge presumably is perceived by some of the diehard optimists as our LAST best chance. So, if it doesn’t work, I hope we unite more fully behind the concept that’s this whole thing is over. I hate to say it, but in democracies, soldiers die while the politics get played. A vast majority of Americans at this point think Iraq is a lost cause. But we have to wait for the body politic (President/Congress) and body political to somehow digest the concept that the US may have won the invasion but lost the occupation. Oh, and the other reason I think we won’t be that much worse off is ‘cause in that arena we’re already doin’ so badly, in terms of any of the things this war was supposed to do for us, the Iraqis, and the world.</p>

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<p>I don’t put much stock in Malaki’s opinions. His “plan” was to move US forces to the perimeter of Bahgdad with the sole purpose of stopping Sunni insurgents from entering the city. Meanwhile “Iraqi forces” (read “Shia militia”) would finish the ethnic cleansing of Bahgdad that is already well underway. [Another example of “This whole thing is so God damned convoluted…”]</p>

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<p>I do put stock in the NIE though. And Lt. General William E. Odom, General Barry R. McCaffery, and General Joseph P. Hoar. They’ve got no horse in this race, other than love of country. I just find it impossible to believe that they are suddenly less competent military strategists than the Karl Roves and Robert Kagans of this world.</p>

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<p>The increased US casualties (and dollar cost, of course) are the only real downsides I see to letting the “surge” plan play out. The casualties could be very high if the insurgents and militias do not go underground to ride it out.</p>

<p>Other than the casualties, I don’t really see how this so-called “surge” plan could destabilize things more than they already are. There is already a full-blown civil war. The forest fire is out of control, the winds are whipping, and we are right at the flash point where the entire forest erupts in spontaneous combustion. Other than the lives of the fire fighters, there’s no way to make things worse.</p>

<p>President Bush has decided to put additional US troops at new levels of risk. The consequences of that decision will be on his shoulders, and his shoulders alone as he has systematically ignored all outside advice.</p>

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<p>Oh, there is one more risk. The longer Bush plays Lone Ranger, the higher the likelihood of the 21 Republican Senate seats and countless House seats getting wiped out in November 2008. I am, personally, not heartbroken by that increased risk, although I do think some of the more centrist Republicans in Congress will be the biggest losers.</p>

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<p>Bedhead: I get your point that the administration may have to get the surge out of their systems because they have too many party member re-election chances riding on Americans not perceiving their foreign adventures as a failure.</p>

<p>So although letting them get it out of their system even if they lose may be what it takes to get them to finally agree to work more effectively toward stability in Iraq, it’s not true that there’s no harm, especially if the efforts create more terrorists and more US casualties, as the NIE report is rumored to say. No equation that leads to fewer people to defend America and more people to attack it makes good mathematical sense. </p>

<p>So while it’s true that we have no choice but to allow the surge to go forward, since the administration is unwilling to consider other options (however well-advised those options are compared to the surge), I think we have to make it very clear to those pushing it that the American people will hold them accountable for the consequences, and that we do see through the political shenanigans.</p>

<p>If nothign else, maybe we’ll be able to set a standard that we will never again support soldiers dying for a party or a legacy instead of a country.</p>

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<p>Most of us would agree that staying with current troop levels is not a good idea. Some believe we need more troops, and some want to withdraw completely. I think it’s more instructive to see what the soldiers, marines, and airmen think.

<a href=“http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZmNhOGRlZmRjMzU2NWFiNmQ1OGQ3NDBiM2ZkNGIzOTk=[/url]”>http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZmNhOGRlZmRjMzU2NWFiNmQ1OGQ3NDBiM2ZkNGIzOTk=&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

<p>On the other hand, the US could withdraw, and as one pundit says, treat Iraq as a humanitarian crisis, which it soon would be.

<a href=“http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ODIxNWQ0ZjE1MzdlOWRjYTI0ZjNiNTY1OTZiZDJmMjY=[/url]”>http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ODIxNWQ0ZjE1MzdlOWRjYTI0ZjNiNTY1OTZiZDJmMjY=&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

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<p>sjmom, I agree that it’s instructive to see what the military thinks about the surge. It’s unfortunate that the National Review is incorrect in its reporting. </p>

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<p>The senator “forgot to mention that” because it’s simply not true. This is the actual data:</p>

<p><a href=“http://www.militarycity.com/polls/2006poll_iraq.php[/url]”>http://www.militarycity.com/polls/2006poll_iraq.php&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

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<p>The % who say that the troop level should be 146,000-200,000+ as the article claims, isn’t “most.” It’s 38%. About the same percent (39%) of soldiers polled said troops levels should decrease or stay the same. </p>

<p>Although more soldiers say they disagree than agree with an increase, it’s really equal, because the margin of error on this poll is 3%. </p>

<p>How did the National Review make such a basic mistake? I think they accidentally counted the “No opinion” folks with the folks wanting an increase, since “no opinion” was at the top of the list. There is no other way they could think that “38% agree and 39% disagree” means that “most agree”. Sloppy work.</p>

<p>Another problem is that the National Review is lumping people who want the troop levels below 200,000 with people who want the troop levels above 200,000, in order to make it seem that agreement with the level proposed by the President (165,000 or so) is greater than it is. </p>

<p>Plenty of people would agree with an increase in troops if it were larger, large enough to be effective by General Petreaus’ calculations, but don’t necessarily agree with a smaller increase.</p>

<p>The actual percent of Military Times respondants who agree with the President’s plan to have troop levels between 146,000-200,000?</p>

<p>22%, so less than one in 4–even if you believe each and every one of those people meant the same amount as the President and no more.</p>

<p>So hardly “most”. It’s not even a quarter. I hope the National Review will print a correction. Our soldiers deserve to have their real views come out.</p>

<p>Incidentally, the poll was of subscribers to the Military Times newspapers, who are more likely to be career and professional military than the general military population. I do indeed give this poll a lot of weight. The views of experienced military men and women are my main reason for opposing the surge.</p>

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<p>“MO, the real purpose of the “surge” is to create the perception of progress (real or imagined) sufficient to quell US political pressure to begin a pullout of US forces. This perception could be created by a lull in violence, signs of intelligent life in the Iraqi “government”, etc.”</p>

<p>Are you SURE it isn’t about Iran, and having virtually nothing to do with Iraq at all? (If you are SURE, what gives you that assurance? not meant rhetorically)</p>

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<p>I’m not sure. I am concerned that the Lone Ranger may actually be thinking about military action against Iran. I am actually a little concerned that Bush has lost his mind. He’s so isolated right now and, frankly, sounding a little like Alexander Haig.</p>

<p>Having said that, I don’t believe that the Pentagon, under Gates, and the Commanding Generals would agree to military action against Iran.</p>

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<p>But they aren’t the deciders. Bush is. Generals who disagree get replaced.</p>

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<p>This has crossed my mind in recent months, as well. Seriously.</p>

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<p>SJMOM: I have plenty of friends who have served in Iraq as soldiers, in a couple of cases as very high level government officials, and also friends who have been journalists there. A couple of random observations: Iraq, southern Shiite Iraq in particular has been crawling with Iranian agents for a long time, said an Army friend. Another, a friend who was the highest up in our administration who I won’t identify further except to say he was a very senior aid official, started out gung-ho, but after a year and a half on the ground, thought we were getting nowhere or worse. But these are anecdotal. </p>

<p>I think if you ask the in-the-trenches soldiers if they need more troops for the mission, you’ll often get the answer of a salesmen who is asked if he could use more marketing support – he doesn’t really look at the cost or the strategy, he just knows more resources for him to work with would be better. Even with this qualification/metaphor, conyat did an ample job of debunking the tendentious statements of the my Republican party is right no matter what the cause National Review. I would welcome arguments that would disprove anything I’ve said here, but if they’re couched in a lot of partisan rhetoric, it begins to look like just an exercise in partisan jockeying.</p>

<p>For people to say that Iraq will become such a disaster and get much worse if we leave is not a compelling reason to stay, unless staying can perform enough nation-building that the eventual outcome of descent into hell can be altered. Otherwise, staying in Iraq is just delaying the inevitable. It’s too bad Iraq is now in this position that it stands on the precipice of gory tragedy. But that’s exactly what a lot of people wanted us to avoid when they argued against going there – going into a secular Arab country that had nothing to do with 9/11 and dismantling the tyranny that was in charge in favor of a utopian attempt to build a friendly democratic state that would be a model of good relations with the west as well as governance. Bush Sr. and his guys got it right in the first war and that’s why they didn’t go in. It’s too bad his son had something else to prove.</p>

<p>I repeat: this war is set to achieve the handing over to the Iranian sphere of control the country of Iraq, giving it to a theocracy that has vicious intentions against our allies and is close to having nuclear weapons. Not a very savvy way to spend $1 trillion, is it? And about troop levels: the right answer, given that the war was fought (against better wisdom) would have been 500,000 for a year or two to keep a damper on all violence and stabilize the country enough to put it on a path of self-governance and service delivery. But Rumsfeld really didn’t want that number, for ideological reasons having little to do with the reality of Iraq, and Wolfowitz ridiculed people who called for more troops. General Shinseki was basically hounded like hell for saying the situation needed much more. So now the drop in the bucket of the surge is seen by those of us who wanted a lot more a lot faster as way too little way too late.</p>

<p>Yes, staying with current troop levels is not a good idea. We should have had more before. Now, if the surge has not worked within half a year, we should pull out and let Iraq further discover it’s own hell, which we have not the power to stop.</p>

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<p>conyat,</p>

<p>You are obviously parsing the data to support your own perspective which is that the surge is bad. However, if your counter to the surge is to reduce troop levels, the data certainly does not support that view with only 26% taking that perspective. If you divide the data into 3 groups: the Democrat view of reduction versus stay-the-course versus a troop increase, the plan to increase the troops is the clear favorite: 26-13-38. In fact if the Democratic plan is that of Pelosi/Murtha and the other “bring the troops home now” crowd, only 13% endorse it - and this is from those who presumably would benefit from being brought home. That is why I think it is very presumptious for Cindy and Jane to try to speak for the military. The military - those doing the fighting and dying - clearly does not endorse their views.</p>

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<p>FF: your 26-13-38 split is accurate only if the only choices are: withdraw, stay the course, increase to the level proposed by the President. </p>

<p>If you add “exceed the President’s increase” as an option: </p>

<p>It’s 26% reduce - 13% stay the same - 22% increase to something like the President’s plan - 16% exceed the President’s plan - 23 % no opinion.</p>

<p>I don’t think it’s fair to lump the views of those who think the President’s plan entails too few troops to be effective with those who agree with his plan. You feel otherwise, that’s fine. </p>

<p>However, even when you and National Review lump them together, the National Review’s claim that “most” support 146,000-200,000+ is demonstrably false. Your calculations are the same as mine, 38%. Not even half. Clearly not “most.”</p>