So much for listening to the commanders on the ground...

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Colin Powell mentioned this Sunday that when he was Sec of State that he met with Assad on several occasions. We had also had direct talks with N. Korea. So, we have been talking. However, talking with one’s enemies is not always fruitful - just ask Neville Chamberlain.</p>

<p>Wednesday, June 4, 2003:</p>

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<p>“Colin Powell mentioned this Sunday that when he was Sec of State that he met with Assad on several occasions. We had also had direct talks with N. Korea. So, we have been talking. However, talking with one’s enemies is not always fruitful - just ask Neville Chamberlain.”</p>

<p>So we shouldn’t try? Is that what you’re saying? </p>

<p>So what we’re doing is the only thing we can do? for an intelligent guy that’s a pretty limited view.</p>

<p>Joint Chiefs say:

  1. White house has no defined mission.
  2. We should not more troops to Iraq.</p>

<p><a href=“http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/18/AR2006121801477_pf.html[/url]”>http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/18/AR2006121801477_pf.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

<p>drb, Tommy Franks was the general in charge of planning and conducting the war. Where has he ever said that the civilian component of the DoD turned him down for more troops?</p>

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Never said that now did I? By all reports, the President is evaluating a number of recommendations.</p>

<p>"Never said that now did I? By all reports, the President is evaluating a number of recommendations. "</p>

<p>But the question is a dialog part of it.</p>

<p>‘Talking’ is not one of gw’s strong points, is it? I think we can agree on that, right? Let’s face it - the guy can’t talk. So why, why, WHY is this guy in the leadership position of our country???</p>

<p>Negotiation and being able to see the other side’s point of view is what makes a strong diplomat. This is a necessary strength for commander-in-chief. gw has NO such skill. He has a 'kill ‘em all’ attitude. No wonder the world hates us (when they’re not feeling sorry for us for having such a dufus leader.)</p>

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<p>I believe that we usually get the government we deserve. I’m very sad for America, but I don’t feel sorry for us. We got exactly what we asked for.</p>

<p>Fundingfather: It was widely, widely reported during the run-up to the Iraq invasion that Rumsfeld had thrown out the Joint Chiefs’ plan and had his people come up with a plan that used far fewer troops. During the early days of the war, when that looked like a brilliant move, it was an essential part of the heroic story the administration was telling about itself. If I remember correctly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time was fired (asked to retire early) over the issue.</p>

<p>As for al-Qaeda in Iraq, there was essentially no evidence of any presence except for a Kurdish splinter group that was fighting both the autonomous, secular major Kurdish parties and the Iraqi government. A few people may have travelled through Iraq. Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party – secular socialists – were absolutely anathema to al-Qaeda. One of the amazing feats that we’ve been able to accomplish in Iraq has been getting Ba’athists and Islamists to cooperate with one another, although it took a fair amount of time (and the emergence of powerful Shi’ite militias that threaten both more than we do) for that to start happening.</p>

<p>This is from a January 2004 PBS interview:</p>

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<p>The speaker is a New York Times reporter, and this IS PBS, so you are probably going to reject it. But they pass my reliability test.</p>

<p>And here’s a link to an even better account, from James Fallows, from the same program:</p>

<p><a href=“http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/fallows.html[/url]”>http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/fallows.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

<p>I was wrong above – it was the Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Shinseki, who was humiliated and forced out of office on this issue.</p>

<p>And here’s a good summary of the evidence on the Iraq-al-Qaeda connection, from that noted liberal body the Senate Intelligence Committee:</p>

<p><a href=“http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf[/url]”>http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

<p>There are about 60 pages of dense evidence and conclusions. The basic conclusion: a few contacts, considerable mutual distrust, no evidence of any significant cooperation.</p>

<p>Of course there was little connection between al Qaeda, bin Laden and Saddam. In Feb 2003 OBL referred to Saddam as an infidel. Insofar as Saddam was a Sunni dictator, anyone familiar with the situation in the mideast knew that there was no loved lost between the two, unlike our great President!</p>

<p>Well Saddam is out and the Shiites are in, so of course OBL and al Qaeda have opportunities there as never before.</p>

<p>Giter done George!</p>

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Are you still falling for that old saw about bin Laden and Saddam not liking each other ergo no way they would ever cooperate. Tell that to FDR and Stalin. There are numerous accounts of them saying mutually supportive things about each other.</p>

<p>originaloog: I think you’ve got it a little wrong. Al-Qaeda is a Sunni organization, and seems to regard the Shi’a as heretics. In Afghanistan, it even participated in some fairly systematic attempts at mass slaughter of Shiites. Shiite control of Iraq and al-Qaeda are pretty much mutually exclusive.</p>

<p>fundingfather: Obviously, you didn’t bother to read the report I linked. At least 20 of the 60 pages is dedicated to assessing the evidence on that point, and it concludes that, while bin Laden may have tried to engage the Iraqis in some arm’s-length mutual cooperation, the Iraqis, and specifically Saddam, had absolutely no use for him and refused to deal with him. The bottom line is that the “old saw” was true (like many old saws).</p>

<p>The supreme irony here, of course, is that the Senate report was intended to blame the pre-war mistakes on faulty CIA intelligence. It absolutely concludes that there was nothing to the idea of Iraq-al-Qaeda cooperation, and it faults the CIA for suggesting that there might be. But other stories I found from the pre-war period make clear that the CIA initially took the position that there was no cooperation going on, but it changed its position after a series of high-level meetings between Tennet and Douglas Feith, in which the CIA was supposedly convinced that it was possible to interpret the evidence to show cooperation. In other words, it was Defense (Rumsfeld) that was pushing that story, and the CIA went along.</p>

<p>And what are these “numerous accounts” of Saddam and bin Laden saying mutually supportive things about each other? The last thing bin Laden said before the invasion of Iraq was that he supported the Iraqi people but that their leader deserved punishment. It’s not a question of them not “liking” each other. It’s a question of them having diametrically opposed world views and being rivals for leadership of the same constituency.</p>

<p>I think you’re drinking the Kool-Aid.</p>

<p>JHS, before you put all your eggs into the latest Senate report, be sure to check the sources for the information that it contains - mostly from interviews with Saddam and his close associates while sitting in jail - not the most credible witness I would say. I would put more weight on communications that were not meant for our consumption.</p>

<p>Check out this document as reported by the NYT
<a href=“http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/25/politics/25TERR.html?ei=5007&en=d9a3d1aa68140e2c&ex=1403496000&pagewanted=print&position=[/url]”>http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/25/politics/25TERR.html?ei=5007&en=d9a3d1aa68140e2c&ex=1403496000&pagewanted=print&position=&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

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<p>There is absolutely nothing in that story inconsistent with what I wrote, and everything specific in it occurred more than 7 years before the invasion of Iraq. It essentially describes limited contacts, and no substantial cooperation, between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Also, the article makes clear that the source of the single document discussed was Chhalabi’s group, the Iraqi National Congress, which had in many instances provided completely false information and documents to American intelligence officials. So the characterizations about the Iraqis approaching bin Laden, approval by Hussein, and letting cooperation between the two organizations develop has to be taken with several pounds of salt.</p>

<p>But even if you believe the document is completely legitimate as a characterization of the state of affairs in early 1996, there is no corroborating evidence that anything interesting came out of the contacts in later years.</p>

<p>And as for the Senate Report: it goes through all of the pre-war and post-war intelligence carefully. Pre-war, there were a few very ambiguous hints of things like the document the Times described, and some weak circumstantial evidence (like Zarqawi getting medical treatment in Baghdad in 2002). Post-war, there was nada, zip, to support the notion that the pre-war evidence meant anything, and consistent positions by all of the Iraqi interrogatees that no one had wanted to deal with al-Qaeda.</p>

<p>JHS, I think that you may be dipping into the kool-aid a bit and it is causing you to stick your head in the sand. There is no way that you can read this document and come away with the conclusion that Saddam and bin Laden will not cooperate because they view each other as enemies. Quite the contrary, it is quite explicit in the fact that BOTH sides were willing to cooperate.</p>

<p>The article also points out that “the document ‘appeared authentic’, and that it ‘corroborates and expands on previous reporting’ about contacts between Iraqi intelligence and Mr. bin Laden in Sudan, according to the task force’s analysis.” </p>

<p>This is the logic that you are expecting me to buy:
Suppose we had not attacked Iraq and then later we were hit with a major attack by al Qaeda involving WMDs that came from Iraq. In the ensuing investigation the document in question plus the cooberating documents mentioned in the article show up. Bush responds to his critics for ignoring these documents by saying “well it is well known that Saddam and bin Laden hate each other, so we decided to ignore these documents and go under the assumption that they would never cooperate.” And you expect that Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi would sit back and say, “you’re right Mr. President, no one could have ever anticipated that they would cooperate despite what these documents say.” </p>

<p>Give me a break! JHS, unlike some here, you have shown signs of being level headed about some matters. I think you need to get in touch with your level-headed self on this.</p>

<p>ff, where do you draw the line? Should the US just keep attacking every country that MIGHT someday attack us?</p>

<p>That’s called preemptive strike. That’s called STARTING WARS, as opposed to responding to an attack.</p>

<p>bush/cheney were set on attacking Iraq well before 911. That’s well documented. And, of course, Iraq never attacked us.</p>

<p>So, where do you draw the line? Just keep attacking each country in the world, one by one, JUST IN CASE they MIGHT attack us?</p>