<p>I’m still confused by the issue of Carter and security. Does he really still have a high security clearance? What for? Obviously, at one point he did, but those things aren’t permanent. He stopped being a federal employee almost 28 years ago. Do we think he was repeating 28-year-old information? Do we think anyone in the Bush administration gave him a briefing with this level of sensitive information (that, by the way, the U.S. does not officially know)?</p>
<p>A more reasonable hypothesis: Carter was repeating credible estimates passed on to him by Israeli or European peace activists, Palestinian sources, or other Arab intelligence sources. He didn’t treat the information as secret, because he didn’t get it as secret. Of course, I am just guessing here, but my guess doesn’t embody the presumption that various parts of the world have gone off-kilter at once.</p>
<p>I apologize for forgetting that it was Iraq’s nuclear facility Israel bombed, not Iran’s. Like many in the U.S., I obviously have trouble telling them A-rabs apart. [smiley]</p>
<p>Bullet: Do we think Israel had a functional nuclear weapons capability in 1967 or 1973? (I don’t have a high security clearance, so I’m not sure, but I have trouble believing it.) In any event, I think it’s an awfully far-fetched to suggest that Israel faced an actual nuclear retaliation decision in either war, both of which pretty convincingly demonstrated Israel’s overwhelming conventional military superiority at the time.</p>
<p>I agree, by the way, that there is a huge difference between Israel’s presumed use for nuclear weapons (desperate MAD response to imminent national destruction) and Iran’s. Traditionally, it has been difficult to imagine that there could be a scenario in which, if Israel used nuclear weapons against Iran, there would be anything left in Israel for Iran to retaliate against. </p>
<p>That was certainly true a generation ago, when something like 90% of Israel’s population was within 60 miles of a hostile border. Things are muddier now with the de facto colonization of large parts of the West Bank, and the utter unlikelihood that an actual war would involve Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian tanks on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway without a lot of advance notice. Forty-one years ago, it was supremely possible that Israel could be effectively destroyed in a matter of hours by conventional forces. The feeling that could happen is still absolutely central to Israeli thought and policy. But it’s probably not true any more, which makes the whole Israeli nuclear deterrant issue more squirelly and scary. I grew up with the belief that Israel was either winning or losing, and if it was losing for more than a few minutes it had lost for good. Using nukes could only be an act of desperation, because everything was binary: either they were victorious, or they were desperate. Now, however, there’s the whole awful spectrum of maybes in between the two, and a thousand different scenarios in which one might or might not make a choice to go nuclear, depending.</p>