Deep ecology and type-b theory of time (Very high on philosophical jargon)

<p>Note: this post is high on philosophical jargon. There are nice wikipedia (and stanford encyclopedia of philosophy) entries on type-b theory, deep ecology, net utility, and utilitarianism.</p>

<p>Hypothesis: Assume Type-b theory of time <em>and</em> assume deep ecology <em>and</em> assume utilitarianism (as applied to deep ecology)</p>

<p>If you subscribe to the type-b theory of time (which most philosophers of science see to do), then the “deep ecology” conception of environmentalism is flawed.</p>

<p>The reason being that life will inevitably be extinguished. But despite that, the Earth has still enjoyed several billion years of life (life without human intervention). Sure, many habitats are currently being destroyed. But the environment will only be destroyed for a very small portion of time compared to the total amount of time that life has enjoyed without human intervention (and according to the type-b theory of time, the present is no more “significant” than the past). In fact, this will be true even if life continues on earth for 1 more billion years (and fact is, life as we know it cannot continue for more than ~1 billion years, because by then, the Sun’s luminosity will be sufficiently high enough to boil away the earth’s oceans). By then, human technology will be the only way to ensure that life will continue. </p>

<p>Okay sure, a deep ecologist might want to maximize the total net utility of the biosphere (and argue that reducing human activity will reduce it, even though the total impact of human activity will still only be limited to a very small fraction of the total net utility of the biosphere integrated over time dating back to 4.6 billion years ago). After all, f(t) = U(t)<em>(4</em>10^9 + 1000) is still bigger than f(t) = U(t)<em>4</em>10^9. But it’s still a very small fraction, and most objective humans will see this small fraction as insignificant. So conclusion: if you subscribe to all three theories, your total impact will be very small (unless you can find a way to migrate Earth’s biosphere into another stellar system before the Sun goes red giant). In any case, if the hypothesis (heat death of the universe) holds [and the evidence for that outcome seems to be rather high], then the impact of any person will be very limited.</p>

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<p>Of course, his judgment of total net utility is subjective [it depends on how much you weigh factors such as biomass, the well-being of “sentient” creatures, and other factors].</p>

<p>Also, this does in no way argue against environmentalism if you’re an environmentalist due to human concerns. There are many valid reasons for that. It also doesn’t argue against deep ecology <em>without</em> the type-b theory of time. Most people do not view the present as less significant to the past. It’s antithetical to human survival, after all. The philosophically unsophisticated may, for example, weigh the well-being of charismatic creatures higher than that of uncharismatic creatures. They may also weigh certain intervals of time with higher importance than other intervals of time. Many implications of utilitarianism, in any case, go against people’s moral intuitions.</p>

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<p>The type-b theory of time also brings up interesting new ways to analyze utilitarianism. Since again, the present is no more “significant” than the past. In any case, assuming type-b theory of time, you can then analyze net utility by integrating the total sum of “utility” (experienced by all sentient beings) over time (you can then divide it by the total number of individuals [each weighted by their level of sentience] if you wish).</p>

<p>Does negative utility cancel out utility? (it doesn’t seem meaningful to talk about one of them without the other). And if so, then what is the reasoning behind the existence of a net utility?</p>

<p>How I imagine it, is that all actions have zero net utility. Where the difference between actions rests is in how the resulting utility and negative utility are allocated; that is, how they are distributed among sentient organisms. The other difference would be the magnitude of the action, or the potential utility imbalance it could cause.</p>

<p>For example, I would say that reducing human activity would cause a neutralization of existing utility and negative utility in the biosphere rather than increase net utility. The focus of deep ecology would be to keep the ratio of utility to negative utility among each specie (and I guess each individual of that specie) as close to 1 as possible, so as to prevent imbalances, or stresses. Nature probably favors increased entropy of utility (regions of utility or negative utility caused by animals are probably naturally dispersed, or eventually compensated for by other animals), it’s just that humans compared to other sentient animals have an incredibly strong ability to oppose nature and increase and sustain a higher ratio of utility to negative utility.</p>

<p>Okay good points - I should actually replace “net utility” with “total utility”</p>

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<p>Hm, very interesting. I’m not sure about that though, since the vast majority of species will go extinct, human influence or not. Human influence could even intervene to prevent other species from going extinct (but that requires huge amounts of technology, and technology requires a large population base).</p>

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<p>Very interesting pt. But I’m not sure if nature intrinsically has a higher utility entropy than human-influenced nature. Human-influenced nature does cause a lot of entropy too, especially since humans fragment habitats, which produce some interesting results.</p>

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<p>Hm, what if your action was raising animals on a factory farm? The negative utility to the animals is HUGE; the positive utility it gives to humans is far smaller (since they could easily get tasty food from other sources if they weren’t so socially conditioned in thinking that meat tastes better than other foods).</p>

<p>Ok. FORGET what I said. </p>

<p>If positive and negative utility are two quantities, then I agree that they would vary over time. After all, the continued evolution of more sentient organisms necessitates both increased + and - utility in the biosphere. Also, counter to what I previously said, I think the ratio of + to - utility would be flexible (i.e net + or - utility in the biosphere could exist). Among other things, the rate of change of the ratio of +/- utility would relay information about the rate of change of biodiversity. On a smaller scale it could model certain population’s growth. </p>

<p>IN ADDITION to measuring positive and negative utility as quantity, I think mapping +/- utility’s distribution would be meaningful. What you would be looking for would be localized regions where the ratio of + to - utility is significantly out of proportion with the one of the whole biosphere. </p>

<p>To make a bad analogy to human society: in governments where the +/- utility ratio of subsets of the populace is extremely skewed, the largest subset (the one that inherently has the lowest +/- utility ratio may revolt (revolution!!). The system of order, or relations between the subsets will be upended. The same happens between species, though the dynamics are different. The result here is often extinction. This is one reason why understanding the distribution of utility is important: it can predict future patterns.</p>

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analysis of your counterexample. I guess my new question is whether actions over time conserve utility. The question seems complex, and I’m not sure why it matters.</p>

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<p>Ok, yeah; I guess I can think of a lot of counterexamples. The thing is they are kind of hard to deal with - how do we define when the negative utility of an action outweighs
the positive utility, or visa versa. In some cases it’s more evident to me, like the example above, but still not fully clear.</p>

<p>Now maybe one could say that if goal A (for example getting food) can be accomplished with actions A1, or A2, or A3… (that is, the positive utility eating gives can be gained these various ways), and if all are about equally efficient, then if two of A1, A2, A3, result in different negative utilities, then those two actions must have different net utilities.</p>

<p>I would concede that this is often the case, as it is in your example. Humans have other options for food, and efficiency isn’t the issue, yet their socially conditioned desire for meat leads them to choose an action with more negative utility than other extant alternatives . What mitigates counterexamples like this, however, is that the forces behind the actions (in your example, social pressures) are not biased towards a negative or positive net utility. Over time actions driven by social pressures should not have a net utility. When the options to complete a goal are equally efficient (result in the same positive utility) the actions should be chosen randomly. Thus, ones with net negative (or positive) utilities won’t be favored.</p>

<p>Thank you for helping us on our ongoing quests for clarity. We value and appreciate your contributions.</p>

<p>I disagree.</p>

<p>It’d be hilarious if tomorrow CERN somehow accidentally succeeded in creating a black hole large enough to destroy Earth.</p>

<p>My opinions: Environmentalism with a long-term (outlasting humanity) point of view makes no sense because all of our actions will still be insignificant. Environmentalism when looking at a local view of time is far more pertinent. </p>

<p>I wish I was more concerned with politics, biology, and metaphysics.</p>

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<p>Okay, very interesting points. You’re saying that imbalances in utility are useful in predicting future patterns of utility (and may cause things such as evolution). In a sense, it’s often quite difficult to predict how to maximize utility, even if we’re believers in “deep ecology”. And of course, since imbalances are useful for evolution, trying to maximize utility (through a short-term approach) may cause species to become “complacent” and then they won’t evolve anymore. This may, in turn, prevent the formation of more interesting organisms. Or more intelligent organisms. </p>

<p>In short, it’s difficult to even assign a utility metric to organisms. What if the arctic ice caps melted but new species came in to colonize the arctic? Is modern day life any more desirable than Cretaceous-era life?</p>

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<p>Interesting points. With respect to which actions will be favored - well - that’s a question of what actions “ought” to be favored. Of course, “ought” does not imply “is”. E.g. the negative utility from eating meat is definitely far higher than the negative utility from eating meat substitutes. But that isn’t going to affect the balance of power since the suffering from factory farmed animals is not going to change reality. Social pressures can sometimes provide the basis for “ought”. </p>

<p>Of course, “ought” is usually far less clear when negative net utility can sometimes give rise to new sources of positive net utility. </p>

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<p>Haha. :slight_smile: yeah, thanks for helping me clarify things. and investigate them further</p>

<p>get more humans</p>