<p>But 4 and 5 aren’t ever going to die, because they will always concede first. We’re working under the assumption that they don’t care whether you die or not. Therefore, they’ll vote for whoever will give them the most gold. Pirate 2 will give them each 1 gold, so if you offer them nothing, they won’t vote for you.</p>
<p>That solution you linked to seems suspect. The question says that you need 50% or more to pass, while the solution seems to be operating under the assumption, like us, that you need more than 50%.</p>
<p>Regardless, I’m changing my answer to 97-0-1-0-2 (or 97-0-1-2-0). Here’s why:</p>
<p>If Pirate 1’s plan is rejected, and he dies, then Pirate 2 will offer 1 gold each to pirates 4 and 5, more than they would get under Pirate 3, thus securing their votes. This means that Pirate 3 is guaranteed to be getting nothing under Pirate 2.</p>
<p>This means that you can secure the vote of Pirate 3 by offering him one gold.</p>
<p>Now, you still need one more vote. Pirate 2 will never vote for you, because he stands to gain 98 gold if you die. That means you need the vote of either Pirate 4 or Pirate 5, both of whom will be getting a single gold under Pirate 2. So, in order to get either of their votes, you have to offer 2 gold, more than they will be receiving under Pirate 2.</p>
<p>So, there it is: 97-0-1-0-2 or 97-0-1-2-0. Whichever floats your boat.</p>