Measuring progress in Iraq

[drb]

<p>Or lack thereof. From that liberal bastion the Brookings Institute: <a href=“http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118429013509165496.html?mod=googlenews_wsj[/url]”>http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118429013509165496.html?mod=googlenews_wsj&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

<p>

We are probably condemned to an inconclusive debate come September. Supporters of the surge will look for promising trendlines and war critics will underscore the negative. Is there a way to make sense of the coming cacophony? Here are some simple suggestions, organized into the three subjects most widely recognized as crucial in counterinsurgency.</p>

<p>• Security. Overall civilian fatality rates from war-related violence must go down in Iraq if there is to be any hope of a better future. Beyond the national tally, it is important to look regionally and ask where reductions (or increases) are the greatest. Such reductions could suggest successful strategies that, if generalized, might offer hope in other regions. It is also useful to track various types of violence. Sectarian-motivated assassinations declined in Iraq this spring, suggesting that the Shiite militias in particular were being partially deterred. But if one category of violence decreases while another goes up, it is hard to speak of much progress, returning us ultimately to the overall civilian fatality rate as the key variable within this category. So far, the bottom line in Iraq this year is not very encouraging – the overall reduction of some 10% in civilian fatalities nationwide, by our estimates, leaves things still substantially worse than they were in 2003 through 2005.</p>

<p>U.S. (and Iraqi) troop fatalities are also hugely important in the American debate. But an increase in these numbers, while clearly tragic, is difficult to interpret. If it results from harder fighting and more effective patrolling, it is at least possible that the sacrifices could result in a better security environment down the road. Trends in the number of enemy combatants killed or arrested are also important – though of course we must be wary of body counts in wars where it is difficult to determine the affiliations of the deceased. Increases in the number of Iraqi security forces taking primary responsibility for local security are encouraging. But we do not yet know if they will be able to do so in the ethnically mixed neighborhoods in and around Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk.</p>

<p>• Economics. Unfortunately, we probably cannot hope for much progress in the Iraqi economy by September. There is just too much violence. Even if the security situation began to improve this summer, it would almost surely remain worse than it had been from 2003 through 2005. The economy did not improve much in those years; it won’t likely do so in the short term now. Could there be more limited progress? Perhaps. We could, for example, have expanded job creation programs in order to quickly reduce unemployment. Indeed, the military has used its Commander Emergency Response Program funds for just this purpose on a small scale for years, and President Bush seemed to endorse the idea in his Jan. 10 speech announcing the surge. But there has been little follow up.</p>

<p>In addition to reducing unemployment, it is important to improve utility performance – electricity, housing fuels, availability of gasoline for cars, water and sewer, and telephone systems. Of these, only telephone and gasoline trends have shown any real improvement in Iraq over the years. The state of health care and education must improve as well. But we have been stymied by the lack of data about them, and what information does exist is not promising. Had the 18 benchmarks mandated by Congress included more such economic indicators, this week’s report card would have been even bleaker.</p>

<p>• Politics. This will probably be the deciding factor in our September debate, as it should be. Gen. Petraeus is fond of saying that politics are 80% of any counterinsurgency operation, and military efforts only 20%. Regardless of whether or not that ratio is right, the broad message is hard to deny. The recent Iraqi decision to forward a draft hydrocarbons bill to the full parliament is not an adequate accomplishment in this regard (as the administration’s report rightly recognized): Actual results that begin to affect daily life and governance are needed.</p>

<p>Given the nature of the failed Iraqi state, it is unrealistic to expect radical progress by late summer. Most political parties will remain highly sectarian and most Iraqi citizens will be distrusting of anyone outside their own group. The majority of normal parliamentary activities – passing laws, creating budgets and implementing legislation – will remain in a fledgling state.</p>

<p>Results should be achievable in making political compromises that allow the process of healing to begin. That is, if Iraqis are willing to make the effort. There must be an actual deal to share oil revenues fairly across all provinces, and a similar agreement on reforming de-Baathification law so it does not punish lower-level former party members. There should be at least initial progress on devolving more resources to the provinces and allowing them to hold elections, on finding a fair way to deal with disputes around the mixed city of Kirkuk, and on purging ministries of militia extremists. The administration’s recent claim that such developments cannot be expected soon, and are lagging rather than leading indicators of progress, is unconvincing. Without major progress on such matters soon, there is little hope for a reduction in sectarian tensions and thus little hope for the success of the overall strategy.

</p>

<p>Sounds pretty bleak.</p>

[mini]

<p>I think there should be benchmarks for the U.S. government, not the Iraqi government. They have their own democratically elected sovereign government, and should not have outsiders dictating to them. U.S. benchmarks should include: since we spent a small fortune on the war and the aggressive, hostile occupation, what percentage of these have been paid back from Iraqi oil revenue? We have spent billions on “reconstruction”. To what degree does this show up in improved electrical generation and delivery, clean water availability, better roads? We have spent billions on education. What percentage of students are graduating with a high school diploma? A college degree? How many new doctors, lawyers, engineers, and teachers have been added to the workforce as a result of this investment? We’ve spent billions on development of “civil society”? How many new independent newspapers, book publishers, and non-governmental radio and tv stations have been started?</p>

[mommusic]

<p>mini–good questions all. My impression from various things I have read is the answers are: zip, not much, very few, zero, and nada. </p>

<p>We are trying to “rebuild” a country while it is still at war–civil war at that. Most of the time we can’t even ID the enemy who is destroying things even as we build.</p>

[Allmusic]

<p>Those private contractors like the “rebuilding”. They are making out quite well, thank you.</p>

[mini]

<p>There was no civil war in Iraq until after the hostile, aggressive occupation commenced, and was much the creation of the occupiers and Paul Bremer’s plan to divide up the provisional administration along religious/ethnic lines.</p>

<p><a href=“HAL Interactive Stock Chart | Halliburton Company Stock - Yahoo Finance”>HAL Interactive Stock Chart | Halliburton Company Stock - Yahoo Finance;

[conyat]

<p>Remember how the “surge” was supposed to make the Iraqi army and police capable of keeping peace on their own? And how critics of the surge said all it would do (besides increase casualties) is make the army and policy MORE dependent on us, rather than less?</p>

<p><a href=“http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19760628/[/url]”>http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19760628/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

<p>

On Friday, the Pentagon conceded that the Iraqi army has become more reliant on the U.S. military. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, said the number of Iraqi batallions able to operate on their own without U.S. support has dropped in recent months from 10 to six, though he said the fall was in part due to attrition from stepped-up offensives.

</p>

<p>To me, this is even more damning than the increased violence. As predicted, the surge has actually reduced the capability of the Iraqi Army. </p>

<p>Yet another neocon prediction turned to dust as the “windbags of war” (people with actual combat experience) were vindicated. If only results mattered instead of partisanship on the level where the decisions are made, how much different the world would be.</p>

[mini]

<p>“Remember how the “surge” was supposed to make the Iraqi army and police capable of keeping peace on their own?”</p>

<p>Be fair - that was the “pre-surge” strategy. But Maliki said today (I just say him on TV) that the U.S. can leave TODAY and the Iraqi military and police can handle the situation.</p>

[conyat]

<p><a href=“http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3556[/url]”>http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3556&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

<p>I didn’t realise that the Bush administration gave $43 million dollars to the Taliban in Afghanistan just months before 9-11, even though bin Ladin was known to be operating there, and despite the Taliban’s brutality towards women and minorities. </p>

<p>The reason for the payment–the Taliban forbid the growing of poppies for opium. As it turns out, the reason was to increase the value of the regime’s own stockpile, and opium shipments from Afghanistan actually increased after the ban.</p>

<p>Considering the size of the Afghanistan economy, it had the same impact as giving $215 billion to a country with a GDP the size of ours. A huge, huge reward for enemies of freedom.</p>

[tom1944]

<p>I read Mini’s post#7 yesterday and found the newspaper article buried on page 12 this morning. - was this dicussed by the politicos today? The Shiite lawmaker Hassan al-Suneid goes even further.
We should have never been there and now the fallacy of “we will leave when the want us to leave” crumbles.</p>

[mini]

<p>The Iraqi government is not stupid. They know that every day that the hostile, aggressive occupation continues, Al-Qaeda grows stronger, with George Bush acting as a giant recruiting poster. Things might get worse if the occupier leaves, they also might get substantially better, as the many elements that make up the Iraqi government and society will have to figure out how to work together. </p>

<p>Regardless, I think massive war reparations are in order, not administered by the U.S. government or corporations, and at least 500,000 entry visas for Iraqi refugees.</p>

[ellemenope]

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<blockquote>
<p>at least 500,000 entry visas for Iraqi refugees<<</p>
</blockquote>

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<p>That won’t happen…we’d be too worried that we’d let in terrorists, like the ones who were arrested in connection with aborted bombing in Britain recently.</p>

[mini]

<p>Of course it won’t happen. Doesn’t mean it shouldn’t. (None of those arrested in connection with the aborting bombings in Britain were Iraqi “refugees”.)</p>

[ellemenope]

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<blockquote>
<p>None of those arrested in connection with the aborting bombings in Britain were Iraqi “refugees”.<<</p>
</blockquote>

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<p>Absolutely true, mini. Thanks for the clarification.</p>