Question regarding wiretapping Al Qaeda calls

[Strick11]

<p>I understood they briefed both the FISA court and select members of Congress on a regular basis. What do you think they told the FISA court. Do you think the FISA court bothered to ask? Apparently Congress didn’t.</p>

[interesteddad]

<p>

if NSA had intercepted al Qaeda Ops Chief Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in Karachi talking to Mohamed Atta in Laurel, Maryland, in say, July of 2001 – if NSA had done that, and the results had been made public, I’m convinced that the crawler on all the 7 by 24 news networks would not have been “NSA domestic spying.”

</p>

<p>What a load of hooie. Both KSM and Atta were under CIA surveillance well before 9/11. KSM for his operational involvments in a number of terrorist attacks and Atta for his involvement in a known German terror cell.</p>

<p>The problem wasn’t that the NSA couldn’t have gotten authorization for monitoring. The problem was that the CIA didn’t know where either of them were. Atta entered the US while on watch lists. If we didn’t know where they were, how were we going to get their cell phone numbers?</p>

[Strick11]

<p>It’s a bad example, anyway. FISA only applies to US citizens and permanent residents. It doesn’t apply to anyone in the country on a visa or illegally. We could have listened to Atta’s calls all day, any day, no warrant necessary.</p>

<p>BTW, we knew Atta’s phone number. The fact his cellphone was used is the only evidence ever offered that the didn’t meet with Iraqi officials in Prague.</p>

<p>And the evidence that he was identified by Able Danger who was prevented from discussing his presence with the FBI is pretty impressive when considered objectively.</p>

<p>

72 hour rule is after, it is paperwork that MUST be done

citygirlsmom, it takes roughly 150 pages of application to get a FISA warrant, assuming one is required. How do you get the paper work done within 72 hours when you don’t know you’re going to want to listen to a particular phone call for more than 72 hours after it’s captured?</p>

[driver]

<p>I believe that’s what they call a “hypothetical,” ID…the word “if” is a good tip-off. </p>

<p>CGM, as is so often the case, the answer to your question was in one of the articles already posted. But in order to read them, you’ll have to take a moment off from slapping your cyber-bumperstickers all over every thread on this site.</p>

<p>

QUESTION: General Hayden, the FISA law says that the NSA can do intercepts as long as you go to the court within 72 hours to get a warrant.</p>

<p>I understood you to say that you are aggressively using FISA but selectively doing so. Why are you not able to go to FISA as the law requires in all cases? And if the law is outdated, why haven’t you asked Congress to update it?</p>

<p>GEN. HAYDEN: Lots of questions contained there. Let me try them one at a time.</p>

<p>First of all, I need to get a statement of fact out here, all right? NSA cannot – under the FISA statute, NSA cannot put someone on coverage and go ahead and play for 72 hours while it gets a note saying it was okay. All right? The attorney general is the one who approves emergency FISA coverage, and the attorney general’s standard for approving FISA coverage is a body of evidence equal to that which he would present to the court. So it’s not like you can throw it on for 72 hours.</p>

<p>I’ve talked in other circumstances – I’ve talked this morning – about how we’ve made very aggressive use of FISA. If you look at NSA reporting under this program – you know, without giving you the X or Y axis on the graph – NSA reporting under this program has been substantial but consistent. This is NSA counterterrorism reporting. Substantial but consistent. NSA reporting under FISA has gone like that. FISA has been a remarkably successful tool. We use it very aggressively.</p>

<p>In the instances where this program applies, FISA does not give us the operational effect that the authorities that the president has given us give us. Look. I can’t – and I understand it’s going to be an incomplete answer, and I can’t give you all the fine print as to why, but let me just kind of reverse the answer just a bit. If FISA worked just as well, why wouldn’t I use FISA? To save typing? No. There is an operational impact here, and I have two paths in front of me, both of them lawful, one FISA, one the presidential – the president’s authorization. And we go down this path because our operational judgment is it is much more effective. So we do it for that reason. I think I’ve got – I think I’ve covered all the ones you raised.</p>

<p>QUESTION: Quick follow-up. Are you saying that the sheer volume of warrantless eavesdropping has made FISA inoperative?</p>

<p>GEN. HAYDEN: No. I’m saying that the characteristics we need to do what this program’s designed to do – to detect and prevent – make FISA a less useful tool. It’s a wonderful tool, it’s done wonderful things for the nation in terms of fighting the war on terror, but in this particular challenge, this particular aspect – detect and prevent attacks – what we’re doing now is operationally more relevant, operationally more effective.

</p>

[citygirlsmom]

<p>So what…paperwork, wow…</p>

<p>If you want to discuss paperwork, look at my mom trying to figure out her insurance for perscriptions, etc, if she can do that than the lawyers can do some paperwork</p>

<p>that is the excuse…PAPERWORK…or the law</p>

<p>wow, if I told the IRS their paperwork was to much, well</p>

<p>again, just an excuse to break the law</p>